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Abstract 
 
Drawing from Roberto Esposito’s recent work on persons and things, this Article studies 
recent attempts to rethink international legal personality. Esposito’s work resurrects the 
claim that personhood operates like a mask, splitting the legal and philosophical world into 
persons and things. International law differs from domestic law in that international legal 
personality has traditionally been the prerogative of states, not of (rational) individuals. Yet, 
this has not completely dismantled the persons/things logic, because the exclusive legal 
personality of states has continuously threatened to reduce individuals into things in the eyes 
of international law. It is perhaps for this reason that international legal theorists have long 
sought to extend international legal personality to individuals and other non-state actors. 
This Article addresses the most recent attempt, namely an attempt to shift international law 
towards a law of humanity. Without taking a stance on whether this project is a good idea 
or not, this Article raises some doubts about whether the concept of international legal 
personality can help in fulfilling the project’s aim, namely to help increase human freedom 
and well-being. This is especially relevant because, regardless of whether legal personality is 
attributed primarily to the state or the individual, we still remain—according to Esposito—
within a theoretical framework in which the dispositif of person necessarily excludes some 
forms of life in protecting or empowering others.     
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A. Introduction 
 
In his two recent works, Italian thinker Roberto Esposito has approached the history of 
Western philosophical and legal thought through the concept of the person, arguing that 
our conceptual world is based on a strict distinction between persons and things—a 
distinction that is the outcome of a long disciplinary process. As Esposito writes, “[a] 
watershed divides the world of life, cutting it into two areas defined by their mutual 
opposition. You either stand on this side of the divide, with the persons, or on the other side, 
with the thing: there is no segment in between to unite them.”1 A thing is defined simply as 
that which is not a person and a person as a non-thing.2 Further, and most disturbingly, the 
persons/things machine creates the assumption that things belong to persons.3  
 
Perhaps even most interestingly, however, Esposito’s work reveals that the persons/things 
separation is not a fact that exists, but is actively produced by the “dispositif” of the person, 
which necessarily attributes subjectivity to some entities, while casting others as objects. 
There is no inherent logic to what entity is a person and what a thing, but this distinction—
at least in the last instance—was produced politically. Thus, the apparatus of personhood 
operates even today like the mask of an actor, from which it derives its etymological 
meaning, in determining who has the right to act. Yet, and again just like the ancient theater 
mask, personhood tends to merge with the actor, making the end result seem almost natural 
and thus hiding its political origin.  
 
The fact that personhood is always politically produced also means that not every human 
being is necessarily a person. This fact takes a completely new twist when it comes to 
international law. When Esposito writes about personhood, his starting point is obviously 
the human person. Certainly, personhood may be granted to other entities, such as 
corporations for example, and conversely, some human beings can be reduced to things—
slaves, children, and women are only some historical examples, and the status of the fetus 
or a comatose patient are some contentious contemporary cases—but the rational human 
being is nevertheless the norm against which other persons are measured. Yet things are 
somewhat different in the case of international law. International legal personality has 
traditionally been enjoyed by states, whereas other entities have been viewed more or less 
as objects of international law.   
 
It is therefore not surprising that international legal theorists have long sought to extend 
international legal personality to individuals and other non-state actors. This Article centers 
on the most recent such attempt, namely one of shifting international law towards a law of 
                                            
1 ROBERTO ESPOSITO, PERSONS AND THINGS: FROM THE BODY’S POINT OF VIEW 2 (2015). 
 
2 See id. at 16–17. 
 
3 See id. at 81–85. 
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humanity and consequently positing the individual as the primary international legal person. 
This Article is not, however, that interested in a possible “discrepancy between the legal 
construction of the person and the natural reality of human individuality,” but rather focuses 
on attempts to draw borders between these two orders.4 In so doing, the Article seeks to 
perceive international legal personhood from the perspective of the two strands of 
persons/things discourse examined in Selkälä and Rajavuori’s Introduction to this special 
issue, namely the “multiple modes of existence” and “moral correctness” approaches. 
 
As already mentioned—and as will be argued in more detail below—international law had 
for a long time a rather strong binary opposition between states, which enjoyed 
international legal personhood, and other entities. But international lawyers and scholars, 
of course, still saw individuals as persons in domestic law and in the philosophical sense, 
thus adopting subliminally a light form “multiple modes of existence” approach. Many 
contemporary critics of international law’s perceived state-centrism, approach the issue 
from the “moral correctness” viewpoint, deriving the international legal personality of 
individuals from their humanity, and making the legal personality of other entities 
dependent on their function to protect and serve that humanity. This present Article, 
however, is not particularly interested in the—admittedly important—topic of whether this 
or that entity falls into this or that category, but rather on the creation and use of the 
category itself, and in particular the outcomes of this use. While generally sympathetic to 
the law of humanity project, the Article suggests that simply changing the primary 
international legal person from the state to the individual might not achieve the desired 
result, for even in that case we still remain locked within the immunizing and exclusionary 
logic of personhood. Hence, the proponents of the law of humanity project should perhaps 
look elsewhere in their search for tools for change.   
 
What follows in this article is divided into four sections. Section B provides a brief historical 
overview of legal personhood in international law. It introduces the traditional positivist 
conception, according to which individuals are objects (things) of international law, enjoying 
only a legal reflex, but also different attempts to change this conception. Section C focuses 
on the most recent and radical of such attempts, namely that of switching the focus of 
international law entirely from states to human persons, or what I call the “law of humanity 
project.” The section introduces different versions of this project and analyzes the role it 
gives to international legal personality in seeking to achieve the change towards “law of 
humanity,” that is to say a global legal order built around the human. I find that the contrast 
between the traditional state-centric notion of international law and the “law of humanity 
project” provides a fruitful variable into the discussion of international legal personality in 
the sense that most, if not all, other attempts to think about international legal personality 
are some sort of hybrid of these positions. Section D provides an immanent critique of the 
use of the concept of international legal personality as part of the “law of humanity” project. 
                                            
4 See ALAIN POTTAGE & MARTHA MUNDY, LAW, ANTHROPOLOGY, AND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SOCIAL: MAKING PERSONS AND 
THINGS 1–39 (2004).   
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Drawing from Esposito’s philosophical work on the concept of the person in general, as well 
as from Jan Klabbers’s remarks on the more specific concept of legal personality in 
international law,5 the section makes three points. First, any use of the dispositif of person 
necessarily entails exclusions, and the “law of humanity” project’s use of the dispositif is no 
exception in this respect. Second, whilst international legal personality might be too valuable 
to be discarded in granting political recognition to various groups, it might not be necessary 
for furthering the well-being and freedom of individuals. Hence, and third, it might be better 
to seek for more direct ways of governing the relation between law and life, and to narrow 
the role of international legal personality to only regulating the status of human collectives 
under international law. Section E concludes.  
 
B. The Traditional Approach to International Legal Personality 
 
In contrast to the naturalist tradition preceding it, modern positivist international law has 
typically been defined as a discipline, which deals with the rights and obligations subsisting 
between states. Ever since it was separated from natural law, the law of nations became 
inter-state law, which was not interested in individuals but treated the state as its primary 
juridical entity, viewing it as if it had a will of its own, completely separable from that of its 
members.6 Law of nations was no longer seen as (natural) law, which applies to individuals 
but as (positive) law applicable only to the relations between sovereign states, imagined as 
moral persons.7 From this also followed that international legal personality (ILP) was made 
the exclusive prerogative of sovereign states—although it must immediately be added that 
there were also at this time international scholars—such as Bluntschli, Le Fur, Heilborn, 
Martens, Verdross, and Westlake who advocated for at least some kind of ILP for individuals 
as well.8 ILP is generally used in international law to refer to “the capacity to be the bearer 
of rights and duties under international law,”9 or to competences attributed to designated 
actors within a systemic legal order.10 As Jan Klabbers writes, “international legal personality 
is thought to be a conditio sine qua non for the possibility of acting within a given legal 
                                            
5 See Jan Klabbers, The Concept of Legal Personality, 11 IUS GENTIUM 35–66 (2005). 
6 See KATE PARLETT, THE INDIVIDUAL IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 11–
14 (2d ed. 2013); see generally EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS (2008). 
 
7 See JANNE ELISABETH NIJMAN, THE CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PERSONALITY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE HISTORY AND THEORY 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 83 (2004). 
 
8 See Christopher Barbara, International Legal Personality: Panacea or Pandemonium? Theorizing About the 
Individual and the State in the Era of Globalization, 12 AUSTRIAN REV. INT'L EUR. L. 17, 33–35 (2007). 
 
9 JAMES R. CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 28 (2d ed. 2007). 
 
10 See Matthew Craven, On Statehood, Self-determination, and Recognition, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 201–47, 215 
(Malcolm Evans ed., 4th ed. 2014). 
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situation. Personality is considered to be a threshold, which must be crossed. Without legal 
personality, those entities do not exist in law.”11 
 
Kate Parlett helpfully summarizes the classical international law approach, which became 
dominant and uniform by the end of the 19th century, with a reference to the First Edition 
of Lassa Oppenheim’s hugely influential textbook International Law: A Treatise, published in 
1905.12 The principles guiding that book are, according to Parlett, that international law is a 
body of law governing relations between states; that individuals are under no circumstances 
subjects, but only objects under international law, comparable for example to territories; 
and that the only link between international law and individuals was through nationality, in 
that while states could choose to protect the interests of its nationals abroad—it by no 
means had the duty to do so.13  
 
More or less the same approach to international law remained in the early 20th century and 
in the inter-war period. Whilst first Bierly, Kelsen, and Scelle,14 and later Lauterpacht and 
some of his contemporaries,15 held the individual to be the ultimate international legal 
person, capable of holding rights and obligations, such views remained rather marginal when 
it came to international legal practice.16 This is reflected most clearly in the Danzig case,17 
which dealt with the issue of whether a treaty could grant rights to individuals. In a 
complicated decision, the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) stated that a treaty 
could provide some such rights when the parties to the treaty so specifically intend, but was 
careful to emphasize that a treaty “cannot, as such, create direct rights” for individuals.18 
Thus, as Parlett notes, the Court upheld states’ “monopoly on access to the international 
system and their status as gatekeepers of international rights and duties.”19  
 
                                            
11 Klabbers, supra note 5, at 37. 
 
12 See LASSA OPPENHEIM, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE (1905). 
 
13 See PARLETT, supra note 6, at 13–16. 
 
14 See Anne Peters, Beyond Human Rights: The Legal Status of the Individual in International Law, in THE CONCEPT OF 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PERSONALITY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 18–19 (2004). 
 
15 See NIJMAN, supra note 7, at 297–325; PETERS, supra note 14, at 20–21. 
 
16 See ROLAND PORTMANN, LEGAL PERSONALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 126–72 (2010). 
 
17 Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig (Pecuniary Claims of Danzig Railway Officials who have Passed into the Polish 
Service, Against the Polish Railways Administration), P.C.I.J. (Ser. B) no. 15 (Mar. 3, 1928).  
 
18 See id. at 17–18. 
 
19 PARLETT, supra note 6, at 25. 
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In this very classical conception of international law, legal personhood was made the 
exclusive prerogative of states. According to the so-called “object theory,” individuals could 
not be right-holders under international law, but only enjoy a legal reflex.20 In this sense, the 
conception corresponded more or less to Esposito’s description of the persons/things 
dichotomy, with the curious twist that persons were not rational human beings but sorts of 
corporations—in this case the very complex corporations called states. As Janne Nijman 
writes, international legal personality “indeed functioned like a mask, a shield at times, or a 
façade at others, that divided the international from the internal situation.”21 It is not too 
huge a leap to argue that individuals were treated more or less as things from the 
perspective of international law. They had no rights or obligations under international law 
and could not access international courts. Even Lauterpacht’s 1955 version of Oppenheim’s 
International Law still answered the question about the position of individuals in 
international law by stating simply that “[t]he answer can only be that, generally speaking, 
they are objects of the Law of Nations.”22  
 
It would however be completely ludicrous to claim that international lawyers saw individuals 
as things. That was obviously not the case. Rather, I would argue that international lawyers 
approached—likely without conceiving it so—the personhood of individuals from the 
“multiple modes of existence” perspective, presented by Selkälä and Rajavuori in the 
Introduction to this special issue. As Selkälä and Rajavuori write, this approach gives several 
“modes of existence” for an entity, which seems to have only one such mode in the 
“empirically perceivable reality.” Thus, under this approach, an entity can be both a thing 
and a person, depending on the external mode of inquiry, possibly leading to a “layered 
narrative of thinghood,” which is free from making value-judgments based on the legal 
status of entities in various contexts. In other words, any international lawyer certainly 
understood that individuals are persons from the perspective of domestic law and 
philosophy. But this was not in conflict with the fact that individuals could have their cases 
heard in international tribunals only if their home state wished to represent their interests 
through the doctrine of diplomatic protection. Furthermore, even if a violation was found, 
the violated party was seen to be the representing state, not the represented individual—
as if the individual were little more than the state’s damaged property. Indeed, even after 
the PCIJ decided that states could grant individuals rights in certain situations in the Danzig 
case, this was only when states so specifically intended. 
 
Much has of course changed in international legal practice and theory since the First Edition 
of Oppenheim’s International Law or the Danzig case. It is now generally accepted that “to 
the extent that entities other than states ‘directly possess’ rights, powers and duties in 
                                            
20 George Manner, The Object Theory of the Individual in International Law, 46 AM. J. INT'L L. 428–49 (1952). 
 
21 NIJMAN, supra note 7, at 469. 
 
22 LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 636, 639 (Lauterpacht 8th ed. 1955); see also GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, A 
MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 35, 53–54 (1947). 
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international law” they can be regarded as subjects of international law.23 Furthermore, 
these rights and obligations are now endowed to individuals under human rights law, 
humanitarian law, international criminal law, as well as to different entities for example 
under international investment law,24 international organizations law, and international 
environmental law. Thus, it is sometimes suggested that the old subjects/objects distinction 
within international law has collapsed as it has been accepted that international legal 
persons are not identical, but rather form a spectrum, starting from the state as a full subject 
of international law and leading to NGOs, which are recognized as subjects by some 
intergovernmental organizations.  
 
Yet, discontent remains among many contemporary international lawyers about the way 
international law perceives legal personhood and treats individuals. While it is true that 
individuals and other actors now have some sort of legal personality in many areas of 
international law, there are also many important areas where they do not, including much 
of the UN system, most notably the International Court of Justice. Furthermore, confusion 
remains about how the increased inclusion of the non-state might be theorized and 
systematized. As Akerhurst remarked in his influential textbook, the practical extension of 
rights and duties to non-state actors during the Cold War period was conducted, in the 
attempt to avoid controversies, without much theoretical deliberation.25 And indeed—as 
illustrated in this special issue in Rajavuori’s analysis of the porosity of international legal 
personality in investment treaty arbitration—international law seems to still lack a 
commonly accepted theory which would coherently describe the relation of a subject to the 
international legal system. 
 
There are, nevertheless, several candidates for such a theory.26 Some have argued that what 
should matter is the actual capacity of an entity to engage in the international legal system 
in a given context, and that we should therefore get rid of the problematic notion of legal 
personhood altogether.27 According to the New Haven School, for example, there are no 
subjects and objects of international law, but only participants to it, this including 
individuals.28 Others, drawing from Kelsen’s conception of legal personhood as the 
“personified unity of a set of legal norms,” insist on the importance of legal personhood, but 
                                            
23 See PARLETT, supra note 6, at 353–54. 
 
24 See Mikko Rajavuori’s chapter in this volume, 18 GERMAN L.J. (2017).  
25 See MICHAEL AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 70 (rev. ed. 1987). 
 
26 For an overview, see PORTMANN, supra note 16, pt. II. 
 
27 See ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HOW WE USE IT 50 (Clarendon Press ed. 1995). 
 
28 See MYRES S. MCDOUGAL, HAROLD D. LASSWELL & LUNG-CHU CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE BASIC 
POLICIES OF AN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN DIGNITY (1977). 
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argue that anyone can be a person, for personhood is acquired whenever an international 
norm grants rights or obligations to an entity.29 Still others argue that human rights and 
humanitarian law have changed the interpretation of international law so that it now 
recognizes individuals as legal persons.30  
 
C. The Law of Humanity Project  
 
In what remains of this Article, I am specifically interested in the latest and most radical 
attack on the old system of international law—one that has, as its goal, a completely 
humanized international law; or perhaps more fittingly a (global) law of humanity. The vision 
of a law of humanity draws from the aforementioned attempts to rethink international law, 
but is also distinguishable from them. Anne Peters argues, for example, that the 
aforementioned attempts to rethink international legal personhood are still insufficient 
because they have trouble recognizing the individual as a full international legal person. If 
ILP is taken to be enjoyed by those entities, which enjoy an adequate amount or density of 
rights to give them certain freedom of action under international law, then individuals would 
fall under a gray area: They might not yet have enough rights to meet the threshold of 
freedom, but on the other hand those rights are rapidly increasing. If, on the other hand, ILP 
were to require rights, which have the right substance, such as the right to conclude treaties 
or join international organizations, then individuals would not qualify at all. The same would 
be true if ILP were to require certain capacities, as individuals do not, at the moment, have 
the same capacities as states in the international sphere.31  
 
Similarly, Christopher Barbara argues that graduated ILP and international capacity rely on 
state action and hence “differ mainly on nomenclature and on where to draw the line 
between being an international legal person and everything else.”32 While individuals and 
other non-state actors might be argued to enjoy ILP of some sort, in that they may, for 
example, appear in certain international courts, such as human rights courts,33 these are, 
according to Barbara, “secondary grants of circumscribed ILP and not equivalent to the ‘full’ 
ILP exercised by States.”34 Hence, “if individuals were granted full and formal ILP on the same 
                                            
29 See PORTMANN, supra note 16, pt. III. 
 
30 See ANTONIO AUGUSTO CANCADO TRINDADE, INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR HUMANKIND (2010); THEODOR MERON, THE 
HUMANIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2006); ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 165–66 (2d ed. 2003). 
 
31 See PETERS, supra note 14, at 36–38. 
 
32 Barbara, supra note 8, at 25. 
 
33 See id. at 23. 
 
34 Id. at 23–24. 
 
2017 Persons and Things in International Law 1171 
             
hierarchical level as the state, it would have to be one specially adapted for them – in other 
words, a new type of ILP.”35 
 
What unites the authors studied here is the idea that the individual should not only have 
personhood under international law—he or she should be the primary international legal 
person, the foundation of the system. Similarly, considerations of humanity should not only 
play an important part in interpretation of international law—humanity should be the 
leitmotif of international law. This also entails either diminishing, or at least radically 
rethinking, the role of the state, as sovereignty is derived from humanity.36 According to 
Barbara, for example, the greatest problem of the international legal system is that the 
preeminent role is reserved for a legal fiction—the state—rather than the human person. 
This is doubly so when it comes to ILP for at that point we are “faced with a legal abstraction 
[ILP] centred upon yet another legal abstraction – the state!”37 In Barbara’s mind, it is 
“extremely problematic to have at the centre of our legal order something which amounts 
to nothing more than a figment of our imagination.”38 
 
If international law has traditionally approached legal personhood from the “multiple modes 
of existing” perspective, the proponents of the global law of humanity seem to take, then, 
the “moral correctness” approach, which has indeed been commonly used to criticize and 
transform existing categories of law. As Selkälä and Rajavuori explain in their Introduction, 
this approach draws inspiration from the rules/principles distinction made first by Dworkin, 
and further developed by Alexy. According to Alexy, law always has two dimensions: A 
factual and an ideal one. The former corresponding more or less to rules as they are and the 
latter to the principles and aspirations behind those rules. The relation between the two is 
such that the ideal world of law allows the critique of existing rules, if they lead to outcomes 
differing from the principles behind them.39 This approach therefore allows a critique of 
law’s borders by questioning the morality of existing rules. This is indeed more or less what 
authors, such as Domingo and Barbara, are doing, emphasizing the “perverse” outcomes of 
attributing international legal personality exclusively to states and invoking the underlying 
general principles of law. This approach radically changes how entities are divided into 
persons and things in international law. Yet in a way, as I will argue in more detail in the next 
section, it returns us (in good and bad) back to Esposito’s starting point where the human 
person acts as the model of legal personhood.  
 
                                            
35 Id. at 29. 
 
36 See Anne Peters, Humanity as the A and Ω of Sovereignty, 20 EUR. J. INT'L L. 513, 514 (2009). 
 
37 Barbara, supra note 8, at 45. 
 
38 See id. at 47. 
 
39 See ROBERT ALEXY, A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS Chapter 44–111 (2010). 
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It is worth emphasizing, however, that there is no uniform vision or clearly defined project 
of a global law of humanity. Rather, it consists of different ideas and arguments, emerging 
here and there among academics, activists, and even some practitioners, but connected 
through the aforementioned common thread of replacing states with human persons as the 
primary subjects of global law. At least three well-developed approaches can be identified 
in academic literature. The first approach is abstract and prescriptive, imagining and 
advocating for a new global law of humanity as a system of systems, built around the human 
person. This approach is represented in its most detailed form in Domingo’s The New Global 
Law.40 Projecting his vision against the background of a world globalizing at a dizzying speed, 
Domingo argues that globalization has brought new threats that the current international 
legal system cannot answer, but also new possibilities for overcoming that system. 
Domingo’s project is therefore one of actively changing the world in the face of new threats. 
Law must be changed, or else it might become “hostage to outmoded, transient paragons.” 
This is, for Domingo, “a moral obligation,” which can be accomplished only by creating a 
system of global law,41 as sovereign nations—which, Domingo admits, were once useful—
become incapable of taking care of humanity’s needs in a globalized world. Instead of states, 
the new global law of humanity would be built around the human person. The human person 
constitutes the normative foundation of the new global legal order. As Domingo writes, 
“[t]he global order rests on the human being, specifically on the unique dignity of the 
individual and collective human person, the true spring of liberty and equality among all 
human beings.”42 If state sovereignty was the foundation of international law, the person is 
the foundation of the new global law. In the new system, it is the individual, and certainly 
not the state, which should hold primary legal personhood. 
 
Barbara takes a similar approach, deriving the need for radical changes in international law 
from globalization. Unlike Domingo, however, Barbara does not highlight the new threats 
generated by globalization, but rather the possibilities it creates for communication. A state-
centric international legal system may have made sense in a time when people could not 
communicate directly with each other, making ambassadors and other state officials the 
most efficient way to handle international relations. This is however no longer the case 
because individuals can exercise directly their “innate interest in interacting with other 
human beings.”43 The time has therefore come to shift the focus of international law from 
the legal fiction—called the state—to the source and end of all law, the human being. As 
Barbara writes, “[t]he very name ‘international legal personality’ portrays remarkable irony 
as the original ‘prototype’ legal person – the human being – is only accorded a minor rank in 
                                            
40 See RAFAEL DOMINGO, THE NEW GLOBAL LAW (reprinted ed. 2011). 
 
41 See id. at xiv. 
 
42 Id. at xxi. 
 
43 Barbara, supra note 8, at 55. 
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the dominant definition of ILP.”44 Hence, “[b]uilding a system based on the human being 
was, and remains, an obvious and relevant basis around which to order the discipline of 
international law.”45 
 
The second approach, by contrast, does not necessarily seek to replace the traditional 
system of international law with a completely new system. It does, however, open another 
way of thinking about the relation between the individual and the state, while nevertheless 
retaining close relations with the global law of humanity idea. This approach aims at the 
humanization of the existing international law by shifting the system’s fundamental source 
of the legitimacy to humanity and the human person. The argument is made perhaps most 
famously by Anne Peters who states that sovereignty has been ousted from its position at 
the helm of international law and replaced by humanity. As she writes, sovereignty is now 
“derived from humanity, understood as the legal principle that human rights, interests, 
needs, and security must be respected and promoted, and that this humanistic principle is 
also the telos of the international legal system.”46 This change is, according to Peters, 
reflected in international practice and opinio juris, which has crystallized “an original 
[primary] international legal personality of the human being.”47 As Peters argues, 
“[i]ndividuals, not States, have become the natural persons under international law.”48 This 
does not deprive states of their international legal personhood, but it does make it 
dependent on the state fulfilling its duty to act as a trustee,49 official,50 or fiduciary51 of 
humanity.  
 
Janne Nijman, too, connects her rethinking of ILP to the more general rethinking of state 
sovereignty. According to Nijman, “we should embrace ILP as a locus of change in our 
                                            
44 Id. at 17–18. 
 
45 Id. at 37. 
 
46 Peters, supra note 36, at 514. 
 
47 Id. at 551. 
 
48 Id. at 552. 
 
49 See Eyal Benvenisti, Sovereigns as Trustees of Humanity: On the Accountability of States to Foreign Stakeholders, 
107 AM. J. INT'L L. 295 (2013). 
 
50 See Jeremy Waldron, Are Sovereigns Entitled to the Benefit of the International Rule of Law?, 22 EUR. J. INT'L L. 
315–43 (2011). 
 
51 See EVAN J. CRIDDLE & EVAN FOX-DECENT, FIDUCIARIES OF HUMANITY: HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW CONSTITUTES AUTHORITY 
(2016). On the fiduciary turn in law, see CONTRACT, STATUS, AND FIDUCIARY LAW, (Paul B. Miller & Andrew S. Gold eds., 
2016); Ethan J. Leib & Stephen R. Galoob, Fiduciary Political Theory: A Critique Essay, 125 YALE L.J. 1820–879 (2015); 
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW, (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller eds., 2014); D. Theodore Rave, 
Politicians as Fiduciaries, 126 HARV. L. REV. 671–739 (2012). 
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thinking about international law and its identity today.”52 More specifically, ILP “can help us 
turn the fundamental relationship between the individual, the state, and the international 
community around.” According to Nijman, legal personality is necessary for a humane life, 
for it guarantees the possibility to participate in common political life. As such, it is a natural 
right of every human being.53 As a consequence of globalization, however, the political is as 
much international as national. Hence, the human person has to be a “citizen” of the 
international community as well, meaning that he or she must be granted international legal 
personality. If states fail to protect this right of an individual, then the international 
community must take responsibility and “transform him back from thing to person.” Not 
unlike Peters, Nijman derives then from this a kind a ILP version of “sovereignty as 
responsibility” or “responsibility to protect,” according to which the state derives its ILP from 
that of its citizens, and has it only as long as it “functions well and its citizens are represented 
properly by the government.” Conversely, the state loses this ILP if it “fails, collapses or falls 
victim of civil war or the oppression of minorities,”54 at which point the correlative 
responsibility to protect the legal personality of the individual falls on the “institutionalized 
international community.”55 
 
Finally, there is a sort of hybrid of the aforementioned approaches. This final approach starts 
from empirically observable trends in current international and domestic law, and tries to 
combine these so that they form a new spontaneously created global law. This vision is 
developed furthest in Ruti Teitel’s Humanity’s Law. According to Teitel, “[a]cross a broad 
swathe of areas—including politics, law, economics, ethics, and public health—a vital vision 
is emerging, which depends on a threshold consensus on the need to guarantee the humane 
treatment of persons and peoples, and ensure their preservation.”56 This vision, according 
to Teitel, is humanity’s law, which can be defined quite simply as “the law of persons and 
peoples.”57 In other words, humanity’s law entails a shift away from international law, 
dominated by state-centric, territorialized rule of law values, and toward a global legal vision 
focused on the protection of individuals and peoples. Humanity’s law therefore has three 
key features. First, humanity’s law operates largely on individuals, granting them rights, but 
also giving them obligations. In other words, it sees the individual as the primary 
international legal person. Second, humanity law “implies a standard of treatment that is 
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53 See id. at 467. 
 
54 Id. at 468. 
 
55 Id. at 468. 
 
56 RUTI TEITEL, HUMANITY’S LAW 17 (2011). 
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based on humanity as both the subject and object of action.” Finally, “humanity law’s 
orientation or telos is the preservation of humanity.”58  
 
To conclude this description of the global law of humanity approach to ILP, I want to make 
explicit the role that the authors studied above attribute to ILP. As has been hinted here and 
there above, the proponents of this approach do not argue so much that recognizing the ILP 
of the individual is important because a certain set of rights could be derived from (although 
this might certainly be part of it), rather, they argue the importance of the recognition lies 
in the change it can bring. As mentioned above, Nijman argues that ILP can turn the relations 
between the state, the individual, and the international community around,59 and according 
to Barbara, we have to alter the way we perceive ILP for its current state-centric definition 
hinders international law’s development of a more human-centric direction.60 Peters is 
perhaps the most precise in this regard. According to Peters, the importance of the 
recognition of the individual’s primary legal personality lies in that it would help to organize 
the law and bring about change.61 Once we stop looking at the qualities of states and 
drawing distinctions between them and all other international legal entities, and thus 
pointing out the deficiencies of those other actors, we might start to perceive international 
law, or perhaps rather global law, differently. For Peters, the recognition of the ILP of the 
human being “is an expression of normative individualism,” with which she means, “that 
politics and law ultimately should be guided and justified by the concerns of the persons 
affected by them.” Whilst individuals might live in communities and have collective goals, 
these goals must “ultimately be measured by the needs and interests of the persons affected 
and are not an end in themselves.” The project furthermore “presupposes that the welfare 
of the human being is a universal concern and a task of the entire international 
community.”62 ILP would not therefore have to generate some set of rights and duties. 
Instead, ILP is a capacity, which precedes any ownership of rights. The attribution of rights 
therefore merely confirms that an actor is a person under international law, but does not 
constitute it. As Peters writes, ILP “can in theory be entirely empty or without function if no 
specific rights are granted”: It is a potential—“but one that is essential to the emancipation 
of the human being.”63  
 
                                            
58 Id. at 19. 
 
59 See NIJMAN, supra note 7, at 456–57. 
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D. International Legal Personality as a Tool for Change in the Law of Humanity Project: 
Some Critical Remarks 
 
Much could be said both in favor, and against, the projects of global law of humanity and 
normative individualism, about their potential and their imminent dangers, but I do not have 
the possibility to engage in such analysis within the scope of this article. I will, in what 
follows, restrict myself to making some remarks on the usefulness of ILP as a catalyst for or 
tool of the projects. In so doing, I take the aim of the projects to be human freedom 
(emancipation) and well-being. I will therefore assess ILP against these aims.  
 
To begin with, I would like to delve a little bit deeper into Esposito’s critique of the concept 
of person, which I started with in this Article, as well as the more general thought behind it. 
The moral, humanity-based critique is certainly correct to point out that the traditional 
approach to ILP tended to reduce human beings to things, at least on the theoretical level. 
Yet, what Esposito’s critique of personhood reveals is that even the moral approach to ILP 
remains within the same conceptual framework as the previous one, and therefore raises 
some doubts about the usefulness of the concept of ILP as part of the law of humanity 
project. In fact, Esposito’s critique becomes even more apt in this new paradigm. As was 
mentioned in the Introduction, Esposito’s work on personhood is tailored especially for the 
domestic context—where the rational human being is the quintessential person. Whereas 
international law traditionally provided an exception to this framework by replacing the 
individual with the state in that role, the humanization of international law movement is 
shifting that position, bringing international law closer to its domestic version and thus 
making Esposito’s work increasingly relevant also from the perspective of international law 
scholarship. Moreover, Esposito’s work deals with conceptual themes such as sovereignty, 
community, individualization, and globalization, which are at the heart of the humanization 
of international law literature and the moral approaches to ILP.  
 
Esposito’s work on personhood builds on his more general work on the dynamics of 
community and immunity in philosophy, political theory, and law. In Communitas,64 Esposito 
studies the simultaneous necessity and impossibility of community. Community is necessary 
in that we have always existed, and will always exist, in common, but impossible in the sense 
that it can never be fully realized. Not unlike Jean-Luc Nancy—whose work Susanna 
Lindroos-Hovinheimo discusses at length in her article in this special issue65—Esposito 
argues that community is not some definable thing, but rather a no-thing, an unpayable debt 
or lack. As such, it always threatens to sweep away individual life and difference, to sacrifice 
the self for the common. For these reasons, at the heart of modern philosophy and political 
theory is the attempt to immunize life against the negative effects of community. These 
                                            
64 ROBERTO ESPOSITO, COMMUNITAS: THE ORIGIN AND DESTINY OF COMMUNITY (2010). 
 
65 See Susanna Lindroos-Hovinheimo’s chapter in this volume, 18 GERMAN L.J. (2017). 
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attempts are the topic of Esposito’s Immunitas.66 Immunization divides the community, 
protecting individuals from the demands of community. This logic of immunity is behind 
concepts such as sovereignty, property, rights, and even personhood. But while the aim of 
immunity is to protect individuals by negating the community’s most dangerous effects, it 
tends to go too far and ends up negating both community and life itself. At the heart of 
Esposito’s philosophy is the attempt to find a reciprocal relation between community and 
immunity, where community refers to difference and immunity helps to produce life and 
protect it from too much protection.67         
 
Whether we attribute legal personality to the sovereign state or to the individual, we remain 
within the same conceptual framework in Esposito’s theory. ILP of course protects the 
individual from being reduced to a thing by the state-centric international order. But it also 
protects states (and consequently its citizens) against the negative effects arising from 
globalization. The sovereign state is an immunizing mechanism of its own, protecting its 
citizens from each other by centralizing power, but it also needs an immunizing mechanism, 
ILP, to protect itself—or rather its population—against dangers from globalization and the 
larger international community. As was mentioned above, globalization is an important 
theme in the literature on humanization of international law and moral approaches to ILP. 
For some authors, globalization entails new risks that the state cannot answer and therefore 
increases the pressure of recognizing the ILP of the individual, whereas others come to the 
same conclusion by emphasizing the increased possibilities of human beings to 
communicate with each other. Esposito’s thought has some links to both perspectives, 
without fully agreeing with either. While acknowledging the new possibilities of pluralization 
and communication opened by globalization, he nevertheless also sees a threat of further 
immunization: Globalization is “immunization driven to the sole principle of the regulation 
of individual and collective life in a world made identical with itself—made ‘global.’”68 
Indeed, globalization is in many ways normalizing. It is “a planetary power that meets no 
resistance or difference that it doesn’t make a part of itself or subsume within its own 
model.” Globalization certainly facilitates new ways of being in common by allowing the 
exchange of ideas, languages, and technologies. But the stronger these processes are, the 
more necessary preventive immunization also becomes. “The more the ‘self’ tends to make 
itself ‘global,’ the more the self must struggle to include inside what is outside: The more 
the self tries to introject every form of negativity, the more negativity is reproduced.”69  
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The need to immunize ourselves against the adverse effects of globalization is an almost 
natural and necessary reaction. But to recap, the problem is that in protecting life, the 
modern immunity mechanisms also end up negating it. Personhood is one such mechanism, 
protecting some forms of life at the expense of others. According to Esposito, the concept 
of person “is born negatively from its presumed difference from men and women who are 
not persons, or who are only partially and temporarily persons and as such always at risk of 
falling into the status of thing.” As Esposito points out, no one was a person all their life in 
ancient Rome. And since then, too, some groups of people throughout history have been 
excluded from full personhood, be they slaves, women, colored people, children, or 
something else.70 This is also true in the case of contemporary international law. As Barbara 
notes ILP is in fact,  
 
a regulatory concept; its raison d´être is essentially to limit 
participation in a legal system. In fulfilling its role as regulator, 
legal personality engages in a process of selective 
personification. This is merely the flip-side of the technical 
mandate of legal personality: to empower one must 
necessarily exclude as capacity can only exist as a correlative 
to incapacity.71 
 
Moreover, the history of the concept of person is not only about “the distinction among 
persons, semipersons, and nonpersons” but also about “elaborations of intermediate 
situations, zones of indistinction, and exceptions that regulate the movement, or the 
oscillation, from one status to another.”72 To be sure, many of these movements have been 
welcomed in the sense that more and more entities have been included within the category 
of the person. But the apparatus of person also always necessarily excludes some entities. 
This is true when it comes to distinctions between states versus the rest, or between some 
individuals or corporations and others, but also within individuals themselves, “between the 
status of the person and the body of the human being into which it is implanted.” 
Personhood relies on “a sort of excess, of a spiritual or moral character, that makes more of 
the ‘person’, yet without letting it coincide completely with the self-sufficient individual of 
the liberal tradition.”73 As Esposito explains,  
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[o]nly a nonperson, or a living material that is not personal, 
can give rise to something like a person as the background and 
the object of another’s sovereignty. Over time, however, the 
person is such only if he or she reduces a part, or the whole, 
of his or her body to the thing.74 
 
Considering the inherently exclusionary nature of the concept of personhood, including ILP, 
it is worth asking how necessary is ILP for the project of humanizing international law? As 
previously mentioned, the proponents of the project do not seek to derive any specific set 
of rights from the status. Yet, where they do think ILP still plays a crucial role is as a kind of 
pre-existing empty platform on which the rights can be attached and which enables the 
participation of the individual in international law and politics. But is even this kind of empty 
notion of ILP really necessary for participation in international law? Is ILP really a threshold, 
which has to be crossed for an entity to be able to act in a given legal situation? Jan Klabbers 
would argue that it is not. Klabbers points out that an entity does not in reality need ILP at 
all for most international legal acts, such as to make unilateral promises, impose conditions 
on others, or even violate international law. In fact, the reality is that all kinds of entities 
tend to act on the international plane irrespective of whether they are endowed with ILP or 
not.75 The obvious counterargument against this is of course the possibility to appear in 
courts, and Klabbers does indeed admit that something like legal personality is needed to be 
able to sue. Nevertheless, he argues that this derives more from rules on standing than from 
legal personality and can therefore be altered one way or the other by tweaking these rules. 
Klabbers therefore concludes that ILP does not in fact constitute a threshold for performing 
legal acts.  
 
This neither makes ILP useless, however, nor does Klabbers argue so. Klabbers argues 
instead that the true relevance of legal personhood is more political than legal and has to 
do mostly with groups. Where legal personality really matters is in that it signals that a group 
is worthy of recognition. Human beings tend to live and act in groups, be it football clubs, 
trade unions, churches, universities, associations, or something else. Legal personality is 
important for these groups in two ways. First, it entails that the group is taken seriously, not 
only in the symbolic sense, but also more concretely in struggles over scarce resources. 
Second, in a rather immunitary vein, the group is shielded, at least to some extent, from 
outside interference, granting it some amount of self-determination.76 In sum, “by allowing 
groups to band together for what purpose and under whatever banner, the law facilitates 
the conduct of politics [as well as commerce] in a stylized form.”77 
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These remarks cast some shadows over the use of ILP as part of the law of humanity project. 
Esposito’s work demonstrates that, philosophically, any approach, which relies on the 
concept of person remains within the same immunitary framework, irrespective of whether 
legal personality is granted primarily to the individual, the state, or some other actor. 
Esposito’s critique certainly admits the importance of the concept of the person, but 
emphasizes that personality of some is gained only by casting other into things. Esposito 
therefore seeks to find alternative ways to conceptualize our philosophical, political, and 
legal world, drawing, for example, from Simone Weil’s work on the impersonal,78 and on 
Gilles Deleuze’s and Felix Guattari’s notion of “becoming-animal,”79 in the hope of loosening 
“the metaphysical knot that is bound by the idea, and practice, of the person in favor of a 
way of being human that no longer moves toward the thing but finally coincides with only 
itself.”80  
 
It is worth emphasizing, however, that even Esposito himself admits that these alternatives 
are extremely difficult (and possibly impossible) to turn into the practice of law and politics. 
Indeed, there are always dangers in making overly far-reaching conclusions on the basis of 
philosophical musings and theories, as important as they might be to shedding light on the 
problem of concepts and practices we tend to take for granted. It is therefore important to 
always pose the question of what do we lose by letting go of this, or that, established 
concept. In the case of ILP, however, the answer might actually be “not that much”—at least 
legally speaking. As Klabbers’s analysis of legal personhood shows, the true relevance of the 
concept lies in granting recognition and certain form to human groups; even though it is not 
really necessary for participation in the legal sense. As such, legal personhood might be 
important for groups, but not necessarily so much for individuals. In fact, Jens David Ohlin’s 
analysis of human rights cases suggests that “[r]ather than illuminating human rights claims, 
the concept of the person often obscures them,” causing Ohlin to conclude that the concept 
is not necessary or even useful in these cases.81 By contrast, Ohlin, too, identifies some of 
those problems emphasized in Esposito’s work (without drawing in any way from Esposito). 
In most situations the problems of the concept of personhood remain safely hidden as we 
use the concept simply to identify “people.” Yet, in those situations when decision-makers 
are put under real pressure and the concept is supposed to do the most work, it tends to 
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become exclusionary and ambiguous as we do not know whether it refers to bodies, minds, 
or agents.82 
 
What the above analysis suggests is that the proponents of the global law of humanity 
project should perhaps seek to achieve their aims—that is to say, human emancipation and 
well-being—through some means other than ILP. While it is probably not wise to let go of 
the concept of ILP altogether, as Esposito might suggest, it could be beneficial to give it only 
a secondary role in international law, more precisely the role of helping groups of various 
kinds to gain political recognition. But the status of the individual should perhaps be 
furthered in some other way so as to avoid the exclusionary, potentially dangerous effects 
of the apparatus of person as much as possible. Indeed, although authors such as Nijman 
are correct to state that “[t]he human subject precedes the state in its existence and has not 
become a person by social contract,” this only poses the question of why should we then 
make such an issue of their legal personality. Does this not only confuse the protection of 
their freedom and equality? Why argue that there is “a natural right to be a person?”83 
Should we not rather seek to establish a more direct link between life and law—without the 
mediator “person”—if we want to achieve human freedom and well-being?  
 
E. Conclusion 
 
This Article started with Roberto Esposito’s note that the dispositif of person divides our 
philosophical and legal world into two camps: Either an entity is a person or it is a thing. 
Drawing from this notion, the article has studied legal personality in international law, and 
in particular its usage by the law of humanity project, which seeks to challenge the way 
international lawyers have typically theorized ILP. In contrast to domestic law, which acts as 
Esposito’s reference point, international law traditionally attributed legal personality not to 
the rational human person, but to a corporation—namely the state. Employing a form of the 
“multiple modes of existence” approach, international lawyers reduced the individual more 
or less to a thing in the eyes of international law, even though these lawyers have certainly 
not seen the human as a thing in the more philosophical sense. The proponents of the law 
of humanity project, by contrast, have employed the “moral correctness” approach to argue 
that the individual should be the primary international legal person, whereas states enjoy 
ILP only to the extent that they fulfill their function of protecting human life, rights, and well-
being. In particular, these authors sought to harness ILP as a tool for producing change and 
transforming international law into a law of humanity. 
 
This Article has not taken a stance on whether a shift from international law to law of 
humanity is a good idea or not. Rather, it focused on the question of whether ILP can fulfill 
the hopes of the project’s proponents, that is to say, on whether ILP can help to increase 
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human freedom and well-being. My fear is that it cannot. This is so especially because 
whether we attribute ILP to the state or the individual, we still remain within the same 
theoretical framework in which the dispositif of person necessarily excludes some forms of 
life while protecting or empowering others. In fact, the dispositif of person is especially 
problematic when it comes to human beings, for it tends to create a caesura within the 
human, between the rational side, to which personality is attributed, and the “animal” side, 
which is then reduced to a thing, thus ignoring the “body’s point of view.” This Article 
suggests therefore that while we should not discard ILP entirely—for its role of granting 
political recognition to various groups might be too valuable to lose—the proponents of law 
of humanity should perhaps seek more direct ways of governing the relation between law 
and life when it comes to individuals. A good starting point for such a search could perhaps 
be found in this special issue in Susanna Lindroos-Hovinheimo’s rethinking of subjectivity 
and community in the EU through Jean-Luc Nancy’s conception of singular plurality.84 
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